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MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
VERSUS LAW AND MACROECONOMICS 
BRUNO MEYERHOF SALAMA* 
I 
INTRODUCTION
Efforts to conjoin the disciplines of law and macroeconomics highlight two
main challenges: choosing the specific macroeconomic framework that is to be 
employed, and reconciling macroeconomic interventions with the rule of law. 
The former can be thought of as an exercise in economic analysis of law, since
the difficulty lies in the realm of economics proper. The latter can be framed as 
an exercise in law and economics, because the focus lies in the interplay between
economics and law. 
Economic analysis of law starts with an economic theory, assumes that the 
theory’s premises are valid, and then uses it to make sense of the legal and 
institutional framework. Conversely, law and economics emphasizes institutional
detail that escapes “pure” economic theory, sacrificing technical sophistication
for greater realism and policy relevance. This distinction, which is not new,1 is 
neither necessary nor devoid of problems,2 but can be illuminating.3 In this
Article, I demonstrate that this distinction holds in the subfield of
macroeconomics as well, where it raises a distinct set of questions and problems.
The main problem of macroeconomic analysis of law is that there is not one
useful macroeconomic approach, but rather several,4 which are in tension with 
Copyright © 2020 by Bruno Meyerhof Salama. 
This Article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Lecturer, U.C. Berkeley Law School and Global Senior Fellow, FGV Law School in São Paulo. For 
helpful comments, I thank Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Merrit Fox, Anna Gelpern, Jeff Gordon, Kate 
Judge, Yair Listokin, Mariana Mota Prado, Mariana Pargendler, Katharina Pistor, Nathan Tankus, an 
anonymous reviewer, and participants at the Law and Macroeconomics Conference at Georgetown Law 
on September 27–28, 2019. 
1. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Law and Economics Versus Economic Analysis of Law, 48 EUR. J. L.
& ECON. 77, 78–79 (2019); Geoffrey P. Miller, Law and Economics Versus Economic Analysis of Law, 
19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 459, 460 (2011). 
2. See Eric Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: Essays by Ten Law School Scholars, U.
CHI. L. SCH. ALUMNI MAG., Oct. 11, 2011 (“The most distinctive and also troubling trend is the division
of law and economics into two subdisciplines—an ‘economics law and economics’ and a ‘law and 
economics.’”). 
3. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, Of Law and Economics and Economic Analysis of Law: The Role 
of the Lawyer, in THE FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 1, 
2 (2016) (“I will explain what I think the difference between Law and Economics and Economic Analysis
of Law is . . . [and] why legal scholars have a particularly important role to play in Law and Economics.”). 
4. See, e.g., EDMUND S. PHELPS, SEVEN SCHOOLS OF MACROECONOMIC THOUGHT (1990) 
(explaining the different approaches to macroeconomics). See also Bruno M. Salama, The Art of Law & 











   
 
 
      
 
     
    
 
   




    




     
182 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:181
one another. As such, these approaches become contentious and force scholars 
to answer a vexing question: which macroeconomics?5 Part II provides a snapshot
of different possibilities discussed in the literature that are based on 
Keynesianism, Austrian economics, endogenous growth theory, and 
structuralism.
Law and macroeconomics integrates macroeconomics with other viewpoints, 
especially legal theory and practice. Its most pressing challenge is that of 
reconciling government rule-breaking—a common practice in times of
macroeconomic turmoil—with deference to the rule of law, which should be 
everlasting. In Part III, I develop the “elasticity” paradigm in law and 
macroeconomics, which embraces rather than conceals the inevitability of rule-
breaking and debunks the artificiality of the “incompleteness” paradigm that
characterizes prevailing views. This discussion shows that the meaning of law is
constantly being reassessed, and this is an important cautionary note for attempts 
to generalize macroeconomic analysis beyond policymaking in specific settings. 
Part IV concludes. 
II
WHICH MACROECONOMICS? 
In the 1990s, dissatisfaction with static microeconomic analysis prompted a 
few scholars to consider spillovers and dynamic interactions among markets.6 The
core debate surrounds two fundamental ways to think about how the law affects 
the economy: (1) first-best economics, which characterizes standard 
(micro)economic analysis of law;7 or (2) second-best economics,8 which is at the 
heart of macroeconomic analysis of law. 
First-best economics posits that if a law improves allocation in a specific 
market, then on that account it can be assumed to increase overall allocative 
efficiency in the economy. Accordingly, standard law and microeconomics 
Macroeconomics, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 131, 148 (“[T]he kind of scientific project that characterizes Law &
(Micro)economics is not readily replicable with Law & Macroeconomics.”). 
5. See Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and
Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (1993) (“If one wanted to apply ‘macro’ to law, one must
wonder ‘which macro?,’ a challenge largely spared those who sought to introduce microeconomic 
reasoning into the law.”). 
6. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Some Thoughts on Law and Economics and the General Theory
of Second Best, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 257 (1998); Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of
Shifting From a “Negligence” System to a “Strict Liability” Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect
Economy: A Partial and Preliminary Third-Best Allocative-Efficiency Analysis, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11 
(1998); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 3 (1998) [hereinafter Markovits, Second-Best Theory]; Andrew P. Morriss, Implications of 
Second-Best Theory for Administrative and Regulatory Law: A Case Study of Public Utility Regulation, 
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135 (1998); Thomas S. Ulen, Judgment and the General Theory of Second Best in 
Law and Economics, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189 (1998). 
7. See Ulen supra note 6, at 216 (“[P]iecemeal, seriatim analysis of efficiency . . . is the convention 
in the field [of law and economics].”). 
8. See Markovits, Second-Best Theory, supra note 6, at 3 (introducing second-best theory). 
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assumes that improving allocation in a particular market is sufficient to enhance 
efficiency.9 Second-best economics10 makes no such efficiency assumption. 
Instead, second-best economics considers that fixing a distortion in market X may
impose an even bigger distortion onto markets Y and Z, so improving allocation
in market X may increase, decrease, or be neutral to social welfare.
To illustrate, consider the problem of incomplete contracts, a law and
microeconomics favorite. Is it efficient for parties to leave a gap in the contract?
Yes, when the value generated by superior risk allocation is lower than the
transaction costs for negotiating the deal; no, otherwise. This is a first-best 
approach. But while those transaction costs would be a net loss for the parties, 
couldn’t the transaction costs represent a gain for third parties through, for 
example, the lawyers’ income, the title company’s fees, and the government’s 
taxes? And once these third-party revenues go down, might the actual losses 
exceed the transaction cost savings? And given the existence of spillovers,
shouldn’t the discussion of efficiency consider the whole “pie,” rather than each 
single slice at a time? This is a second-best approach. 
Second-best economics matters for present purposes precisely because 
connections between markets are at the heart of macroeconomics. To see why,
consider the IS-LM model (or Hicks-Hansen model), which is almost invariably 
the first step for instruction in macroeconomics. The IS-LM model examines the 
relationship between interest rate on government bonds and economic output or 
GDP. It accounts for the intuitive notion that when base interests go up, inflation
tends to go down, but employment, investment, and growth tend to go down as 
well. This is a “macro” model not merely because it incorporates interest rates,
growth and other aggregate measurements, but because interest rates and output 
are determined together. 
Why, then, did the emergence of second-best economics in the 1990s not 
fructify into a law and macroeconomics movement at that time? A plausible
explanation is that the law and economics scholars interested in second-best 
reasoning refused to engage with the broader macroeconomic theories that 
provide a framework to study interplays between markets. Possibly, they viewed
such theories as too radical a departure from the tradition of law and 
microeconomics.11 
9. For a rare exception, see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 98 (1987) (“[Ours] is a theory about judicial behavior rather than global 
optima . . . .”). 
10. For the formal statement, see R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second
Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). 
11. Macroeconomic thinking instead entered law and economics through the backdoor, mostly 
through what Mariana Pargendler calls the relinquishment of “modularity” in law and economics. See
Mariana Pargendler, Controlling Shareholders in the Twenty-First Century: Complicating Corporate 
Governance Beyond Agency Costs, 45 J. CORP. L. 16–17 (forthcoming 2020) https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3474555 [https://perma.cc/59W9-9EF6]. (“[In the] form of modularity
premised on functional specialization . . . each field of law has one key efficiency objective . . . . While— 
remarkably—such modular specialization came to dominate policy discourse since the 1980s, it is 
increasingly coming under attack.”)











    
 
   
 
   
  
  
   




    
 
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
184 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:181
The 2007–08 financial crisis and subsequent developments made clear the 
limits of first-best thinking for law and economics scholars.12 Pressing topics post-
crisis include price and monetary stability, systemic risk and bailouts, regulation 
of the banking and shadow banking system, unconventional monetary policy and 
central bank accountability, trade deficits and protectionism, growth and 
expansionary regulation, unemployment and inequality, among many others. 
These topics used to be outside of the purview of law and economics scholarship
precisely because they evoked macroeconomics, instead of microeconomics.13 
Surprisingly, the first legal scholar to overtly discuss macroeconomics in the
aftermath of the 2007–08 crisis was (as far as I have been able to determine) 
Richard Posner. Posner, father of what once was “standard” law and 
(micro)economics, published books in 2009 and 2010 discussing macroeconomics 
at length14 that mark his unexpected conversion to Keynesianism.15 This 
Keynesian strand was then developed by Yair Listokin16 and others who focused
mostly on law as a tool for short-term countercyclical management of the
business cycle.17 
But Keynesian-inspired countercyclical manipulation of legal institutions is 
hardly the only option for macroeconomic analysis of law. This is demonstrated 
historically by the U.S. response to high inflation in the 1970s. Before achieving 
consensus to implement Volcker’s hawkish monetary policies, the United States
toyed with other initiatives such as the introduction of wage and price controls.18 
This episode is crucial in a certain narrative that portrays macroeconomic 
12. See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 4 (2012) (“[T]he whole emphasis 
of modern law and economics on microeconomics . . . equips policymakers poorly when they seek to 
address the most central questions they must confront. Policy is often about macro-level change, not 
about the fine-grained decisions that economists designed microeconomics to model. And
macroeconomics, not microeconomics, studies the economy as a whole and therefore focuses on the
systemic risks and economic development opportunities that should constitute a major focus for
policymakers.”).  
13. This is not to deny that such problems can also be addressed by combining law and
microeconomics. For an emblematic example, see Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow
Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411 (2017). 
14. See generally  RICHARD POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 274 (2010) 
(“Keynes was the greatest economist of the twentieth century.”); RICHARD POSNER, THE FAILURE OF
CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).  
15. Richard A. Posner, How I Became a Keynesian, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 23, 2009), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/69601/how-i-became-keynesian [https://perma.cc/PY5M-HRAU]. 
16. See YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS 25 
(2019). See also Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of Macroeconomics for 
Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 45 (2012). 
17. See, e.g. Zachary D. Liscow, Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for 
Employment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (2016); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric
A. Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 857 (2017). 
18. See  ROBERT J. SAMUELSON, THE GREAT INFLATION AND ITS AFTERMATH: THE PAST AND 
FUTURE OF AMERICAN AFFLUENCE 91, 99 (2010) (discussing the “repeated efforts—all ultimately 
failures—to suppress inflation through various forms of voluntary and mandatory wage and price
controls. President Johnson, Nixon and Carter all tried this approach . . . . The history of Nixon’s controls
can be quickly summarized: They worked; they weakened; they collapsed . . . Carter’s efforts to grapple 
with inflation were as fumbling and futile as Nixon’s—perhaps more so”).
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analysis of law as a phenomenon of the post-Great Moderation period (1987– 
2007), since the failure of wage and price controls “tarnish[ed]” and
“discouraged” the development of law and macroeconomics.19 
The implicit message is that there are only two responses to inflation: first, 
monetarism, characterized as a “non-legal” kind of response; and second, wage 
and price controls, viewed as “legal” in nature but overall ineffective.20 This 
message misses two possibilities. The first is that the legal response to inflation is 
not the addition of a new distortion, but the removal of an existing one. In the 
1970s, this was part of the conversation, at least in academic circles. 
The road not taken was memorably proposed in 1976 by F. A. Hayek.21 Hayek
contended that, to tame inflation, the United States should abolish the dollar’s 
legal tender and introduce competition in currency.22 While such a proposal 
probably sounds counterproductive and radical to present-day ears, the existence
of Hayek’s proposal shows that macroeconomic analysis of law needs not be 
Keynesian (and can in fact be anti-Keynesian).
Furthermore, the view of price controls as the only possible “legal” response
to inflation misses successful initiatives worldwide. For example, in the mid-1990s
Brazil tamed four-digit annual inflation with a creative mix of policies where legal
engineering was critical: It created a virtual currency free from inflation, known 
as the “unit of real value” (URV).23 Brazil denominated all contracts in the
economy in URVs. Payments in the real economy continued to be made in the
cruzeiro real, the national fiat currency. The nominal value of the URV in 
Brazilian cruzeiros was adjusted daily to reflect inflation, and the Central Bank
sold dollars every time the price of Brazilian equivalent of one dollar reached one 
URV.24 
At some point, a new law transformed the URV into a new national
currency—the real, which replaced the old cruzeiro real. Brazil’s URV strategy 
effectively combatted inflation, which came to the surprise of many, including the 
International Monetary Fund, which had refused to support the plan.25 To be 
sure, high inflation has long ceased to be a core concern in most countries. Yet 
the lesson, useful for devotees of monetary shock therapy, is not an endorsement 
19. Yair Listokin, Law and Macro: What Took So Long?, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2020, 
at 141, 141–42. 
20. Id. 
21. See generally F. A. HAYEK, CHOICE IN CURRENCY: A WAY TO STOP INFLATION (1976). 
22. See generally id. at 9–22. 
23. See Julia Y. Lee, Money Norms, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 57, 101 (2017) (“To combat skyrocketing
hyperinflation in the 1990s, the Plano Real created a virtual currency, the Real, to replace the Brazilian
cruzeiro.”)
24. For a detailed explanation, see GUSTAVO H.B. FRANCO, THE REAL PLAN AND THE 
EXCHANGE RATE 1–11 (2000). 
25. See  LEE J. ALSTON ET AL., BRAZIL IN TRANSITION: BELIEFS, LEADERSHIP, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 101 (2016) (“[T]he cards seemed stacked against the Real Plan: the IMF 
refused to officially support the plan; the World Bank expressed skepticism on several occasions; and the
US government refused to grant a zero coupon bond loan to back the plan.”). 


















   
     
     
 
 
   
   
  
 
   
    
  
   
 
 
    
  
 
186 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:181
of demand pull inflation, but rather the cautionary note that law can sometimes 
work as a price coordination and disinflation mechanism.26 
A trend in the field of law and economics that is intimately related to
macroeconomics is a concern with economic growth. Recent scholarship by 
Robert Cooter–another founding father of law and economics who has jumped
ship from static economic analysis—offers a telling example. Cooter now 
espouses “law and growth economics”—the study of how law increases economic 
innovation—as opposed to the traditional project of “law and efficiency
economics,” which explains how law improves resource allocation.27 
The “paradox of growth” is at the heart of his recent work coauthored with 
Aaron Eldlin: “rapid innovation requires competition for extraordinary
profits,”28 yet perfect competition, which is otherwise the reference point for 
optimality, implies that all firms earn ordinary profits—leading to slow 
innovation.29 As such, a distinction is drawn between innovating and non-
innovating production (the “separation principle”),30 wherein the policy goal
would be to “strengthen the market power of innovators against consumers and 
producers who do not innovate.”31 The separation principle is complemented by
the “fertility principle,” which prescribes that “law and policy should strengthen 
the market power of fertile innovators against sterile innovators.”32 Although
Cooter and Edlin do not work out the concrete implications of their ideas as the
book is unfinished, it is not hard to foresee implementation difficulties since the 
proposal would be a hard swallow for lawyers, who turn to discussions over 
impartiality and equity almost reflexively.
There is no question that Cooter and Edlin’s law and growth economics is, in 
fact, law and macroeconomics. Their ideas further fit comfortably within the
paradigm of endogenous growth theory,33 a branch of macroeconomics that
focuses on the concrete determinants of economic growth and opens the “black 
box” of total factor productivity in the economy. Accordingly, growth is primarily
26. Peter Kingstone, Sobering Up and Going Global: Brazil’s Progress from Populism and 
Protectionism, 15 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 105, 113–14 (2009). 
27. See generally  ROBERT COOTER, preface to RICHARD COOTER & AARON EDLIN, THE 
FALCON’S GYRE: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC INNOVATION AND GROWTH (2014), 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/resources/cooter.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ43-U2PJ]. 
28. Id. at 4.2.
 29. Id. at 4.2–4.3.
 30. See id. at 4.7–4.8. 
31. Id. at 5.10. 
32. Id.
 33. See  AGNÈS BÉNASSY-QUÉRÉ ET AL., ECONOMIC POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 482–83
(2010) (highlighting Schumpeterian creative destruction as a form of endogenous growth theory). See 
also  PHILIPPE AGHION & PETER HOWITT, ENDOGENOUS GROWTH THEORY 1 (1998) (“[P]eople’s
innovative activities are conditioned by the laws, institutions, customs, and regulations that affect their
incentive and their ability to appropriate rents from newly created knowledge . . . . [T]he purpose 
of endogenous growth theory is to seek some understanding of this interplay between technological 
knowledge and various structural characteristics of the economy . . . and how such an interplay results in 
economic growth.”). 
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the result of investments in innovation by profit-seeking agents,34 and not simply
the byproduct of some unexplained technical progress premised on greater 
investment in machinery and equipment. And, to be sure, a discussion of 
endogenous growth is no newcomer to legal debates, especially in international 
patent law.35 
The creation of conditions to generate growth have also been a core concern 
in the “law and development” research field, which is a hodge-podge of studies 
promoting the idea that law can be instrumentalized to ameliorate problems 
linked to underdevelopment.36 The economics that underlie such studies, when
identifiable, vary greatly, but a reliance on structuralism and new structuralism— 
perhaps a shorthand for mistrust of market-led growth—is common.37 However, 
a non-negligible part of those interested in law and development take the 
opposite stance and emphasize the role of property and contract law to promote
coordination and achieve growth.38 As can be seen, the menu of macroeconomic 
perspectives to analyze law is broad. 
III
RULE-BREAKING AND THE ELASTICITY PARADIGM
The alternative project at the crossroads of the disciplines of law and
macroeconomics focuses not on economic theories and their applications, but on
the role of lawyers and their understanding of the subtle workings of the legal 
system. Here, I focus on government rule-breaking during times of 
macroeconomic crisis, a circumstance far from uncommon. Rule-breaking is
problematic because in constitutional democracies, government actions are 
expected to pass constitutional muster and withstand court oversight. Yet legal 
scholars interested in macroeconomics often skip this vexing problem, preferring 
to discuss channels of accountability and other topics of political expediency.39 In
34. See Paul M. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 1, Winter 1994, 
at 3, 4–10 (examining the link between GDP and investment). 
35. See, e.g., Daniel Benoliel, Patent Club Convergence Among Nations, 18 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 297 (2014); Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Meyerhof Salama, Towards an Intellectual Property 
Bargaining Theory: The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 265 (2010). 
36. For an overview, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & MARIANA MOTA PRADO, ADVANCED
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (2014). See also  THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
37. David M. Trubek et al., Toward a New Law and Development: New State Activism in Brazil and 
the Challenge for Legal Institutions, 4 WORLD BANK L. REV 281 (2013) (discussing how law, especially
public law, can improve state activism in the industrial sector of the developing world). 
38. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE 
THIRD WORLD (1989); KENNETH DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT (2006). But see David Kennedy, Some Caution about Property Rights as a
Recipe for Economic Development, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2011) (advising caution when considering
property rights as the solution for economic development). 
39. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1057 (2009)
(“[M]uch of what appears as rule-breaking in [financial crisis] containment is neither good nor bad, but 
unavoidable. Legal and institutional design for crisis response should reflect this reality, with channels of
accountability appropriate to the tasks of containment.”). 
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this Part, I develop a theoretical account that upholds the legality of rule-
breaking during exceptional circumstances. 
As a first approximation, the law has difficulty in dealing with ex post 
government actions that are not protected by an express legal safeguard. By 
“safeguard,” I mean a legal text that makes room for governments to adopt 
extraordinary measures in face of economic shortfalls. To illustrate the concept 
of safeguard, the “scarce currency clause” set out under Article 7 of the Articles
of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund authorizes countries
“temporarily to impose limitations on freedom of exchange operations in the 
scarce currency.”40 
The existence of such safeguards creates a dilemma. By making room for 
episodic circumvention of the general rules during exceptional circumstances, 
safeguard clauses protect the rule of law and can greatly reduce the prospects of 
court challenges. However, they can also promote moral hazard and other evils. 
Thus, for example, in 2008 the Federal Reserve (Fed) provided tailored financial 
assistance to systemically important firms based on a safeguard set out under
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which granted powers to the Fed to 
lend to “any individual, partnership, or corporation” in “unusual and exigent 
circumstances.”41 As a result, the Fed bailouts were largely viewed as legally 
defensible.42 At the same time, these measures were perceived as having created 
moral hazard because they signaled that the Fed was ready to bail out firms 
making losing bets in financial markets.43 
This dilemma can be framed in terms of two informational challenges. On one 
hand, the creation of a safeguard remedies the impossibility of transforming 
existing information into normative statements that can precisely guide
government interventions in future states of the world. This is not an asymmetry 
of information between the industry and government, but rather a more 
fundamental problem of uncertainty, since no one knows or even can know when
exactly such exceptional government action will be needed and justifiable.
40. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. 7, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401,
T.I.A.S. No. 1501. 
41.  12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012). 
42. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Don’t End or Audit the Fed: Central Bank 
Independence in an Age of Austerity, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 30 (2016) (“[T]he claim that the Fed
exceeded its authority in the Bear Stearns and AIG bailouts, even when fully credited, does not come
close to demonstrating a pattern of law breaking.”); Thomas O. Porter II, The Federal Reserve’s Catch-
22: A Legal Analysis of the Federal Reserve’s Emergency Powers, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 483, 485 (2009)
(“This statutory authority made each action taken in the Bear bailout legally defensible.”). But see
Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From Market 
Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 369, 392 (2009)
(portraying the Fed’s actions during the 2007-08 crisis as violations of the rule of law); Lawrence H. 
White, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Central Bankers?, 30 CATO J. 451, 451 (2010) (during the crisis 
government “consider[ed] every possible remedy but applying the rule of law”). 
43. José Gabilondo, Financial Hospitals: Defending the Fed’s Role as a Market Maker of Last Resort, 
36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 731, 775 (2013) (“The Bear deal did create a moral hazard by sending a signal 
that the federal government might come to the assistance of nonbank firms that had made losing bets in 
the credit market.”). 
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On the other hand, the creation of the safeguard can reinforce perceptions 
that the government will step in to implement this exceptional remedy, which can
lead to unfortunate consequences. Bailouts are again a classic example: The
existence of a statutory bailout clause can cause excessive risk-taking within an
industry.44 Here, moral hazard arises exactly because of asymmetric information 
between the government and the industry. Such informational asymmetry can
only be partly mitigated by prudential regulation.
This formulation, using the bailout example, illustrates the “incompleteness”
paradigm in law and policy, which envisions that the legal conditioning of market 
participants is limited in two ways. The first limit arises from the human inability 
to fully anticipate and specify the future and thus the impossibility of drafting 
complete (that is, fully specified) legislation. The second limit relates to the 
linguistic imprecision which renders even the most clearly-drafted and
unambiguous legislation subject to subtle distinctions when approached from 
different cannons of interpretation.
Safeguards, as well as general clauses and indeterminate legal concepts, 
represent partial solutions to the incompleteness paradigm. They counteract the
challenges posed by limited human rationality and vagueness of the laws. Yet the
informational limits that justify the use of general clauses and safeguards in 
legislation do not solve all of the relevant challenges posed to policymaking 
because some challenges are structural, not merely informational.
That is to say, changing the law can hardly change certain facts on the ground. 
For example, Brazilian banking law expressly authorizes the central bank to 
“monopolize” foreign exchange transactions “whenever a grave disequilibrium 
in the balance of payments occurs or there are serious reasons to foresee such 
imminent situation.”45 Critics argued that this safeguard heightened creditors’ 
risk perceptions and thus Brazil’s borrowing costs in dollars, and should therefore 
be removed.46 Yet the removal of this statutory authorization could never by itself 
turn Brazil’s currency into an international safe asset or a store of value, which is 
why the safeguard was never eliminated.47 This amounts to the recognition that 
the fragility of Brazil’s currency was not a legal problem, but rather a factual one. 
The existence of structural (or “real world”) problems exemplified by the 
inherent fragility of the Brazilian currency explains the need for swift
governmental intervention beyond the limited space granted by preexisting 
44. Thomas F. Hellmann et al., Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential 
Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 147, 148 (2000) (“[B]anks choose a 
risky asset portfolio that pays out high profits or bonuses if the gamble succeeds but leaves depositors, or
their insurers, with the losses if the gamble fails.”).
45. Lei N° 4.595, de 12.31.1964, art. 4, XVIII, translated at https://www.microfinancegateway.org/ 
sites/default/files/mfg-en-paper-brazil-law-no-4595-of-december-31-1964-may-2000.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DA9K-2TNR].
 46. See Persio Arida, Por uma Moeda Plenamente Conversível, 23 REVISTA DE ECONOMIA 
POLÍTICA 151, 153 (2002). 
47. Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo & Ricardo Carneiro, O Mito da Conversibilidade, 24 REVISTA DE 
ECONOMIA POLÍTICA 218, 220 (2004). 
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safeguards and other general clauses. Lawmakers can eliminate the provision 
authorizing the central bank to “monopolize” foreign exchange transactions, but 
cannot eliminate the need for the central bank to do so under extreme
circumstances (the same applies to bailouts, of course). And even if that specific 
safeguard is retained, there may be circumstances where the central bank will be 
forced to exceed the limits and conditions laid out by the safeguard—not because 
of legal circumstances, but because of a factual circumstance. 
This observation unveils the limitations of the incompleteness paradigm and
suggests the need for an alternative that can accommodate the inevitability of 
government rule-breaking. I call this approach the “elasticity paradigm,”48 the
essence of which is that policymaking is not only the art of writing down the
formula that will subsequently constrain decision-making, but also the set of
continuous government efforts that establish, fine-tune, update, and defend the
institutional framework at hand—in most cases through rule-making and rule-
following, but sometimes with rule-breaking. 
Greater tolerance for rule-breaking might suggest that the elasticity paradigm
represents a denial of the rule of law, but this is not the case. The paradigm should 
be better framed as a compromise between the ex ante concerns with improving 
the rules of the game, and the recognition that certain games may depend 
(temporarily, at least) upon their occasional subversion—whether it is Mario
Draghi declaring that the European Central Bank is ready to do “whatever it 
takes”49 to preserve the Euro, Richard Nixon deciding to close the gold window 
to “defend the dollar against the speculators,”50 or Franklin Roosevelt taking the
United States off of the gold standard because “the whole problem before us is 
to raise commodity prices.”51 Thus, the elasticity paradigm recognizes that where 
there are no safeguards in place, governments may have no option other than to 
break the law. Crucially, this rule-breaking should not be viewed as necessarily a
contradiction of the rule of law. 
Distinguishing between constitutive and regulative rules illuminates the 
point: In the words of John Searle, “regulative rules regulate antecedently or
independently existing forms of behavior[,]” while “constitutive rules do not 
merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behavior.”52 To illustrate, 
48. See Bruno Meyerhof Salama & Osny da Silva Filho, Elasticity, Incompleteness, and 
Constitutive Rules, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 30, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/ 
07/30/elasticity-incompleteness-and-constitutive-rules/ [https://perma.cc/H23S-DYY8] (articulating the 
“incompleteness paradigm”). 
49. Mario Draghi, President, European Cent. Bank, Remarks at the Global Investment Conference
(July 26, 2012), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html [https://perma.cc/ 
58KE-VDFP]. 
50. Richard Nixon, U.S. President, Address to the Nation (Aug. 15, 1971), https://www.cvce.eu/ 
content/publication/1999/1/1/168eed17-f28b-487b-9cd2-6d668e42e63a/publishable_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5A9F-RQHS]. 
51. ROGER DANIELS, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: ROAD TO THE NEW DEAL, 1882–1939, at 140 
(2015). 
52. JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 33
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1969). 
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Searle describes that “[t]he rules of football or chess, for example, do not merely 
regulate playing football or chess, but as it were they create the very possibility 
of playing such games.”53 
The distinction between constitutive and regulative rules makes clear the
differences between the paradigms of incompleteness and elasticity. The 
incompleteness paradigm incorporates conserving policy within the malleability 
of regulative rules, such as safeguards. Thus, if preserving a policy requires 
governmental crisis containment actions that step outside of the quadrants 
established by regulative rules, then the incompleteness paradigm requires either
letting go of the policy or of the rule of law. The constitutive rules—notably, the 
rules that determine that pre-established laws should be applied—must however 
remain untouched, pursuant to what is sometimes referred to as the “inviolability
dogma.”54 
Conversely, greater tolerance for governmental crisis “containment”55 
measures permitted under the elasticity paradigm opens a wedge in the
inviolability dogma. This tolerance shows that even constitutive rules must 
sometimes be violated, if only temporarily, in order to preserve a higher goal such 
as the integrity of the macroeconomy, the welfare of most, and ultimately the rule 
of law itself.56 
The elasticity paradigm is of great practical relevance to discussions over the
legality of governmental crisis containment actions. Consider again the problem 
of bailouts. In response to criticism of the 2008 bailouts, Congress enacted the 
Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank), which expressly aimed “to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts.”57 Dodd-Frank also amended existing law to curtail 
the ability of the Fed to implement rescue operations and emergency lending.58 
Yet, in a system of private money creation and concentrated banking, the demise
of systemically-important entities can have devastating consequences, rendering
the complete elimination of bailouts unrealistic59 and the Dodd-Frank 
53. Id.
 54. See Guglielmo Feis & Umberto M. Sconfienza, Challenging the Constitutive Rules Inviolability
Dogma, 3 PHENOMENOLOGY & MIND 127 (2012). 
55. See Gelpern, supra note 39. 
56. See, e.g., Gene Healy, Remembering Nixon’s Wage and Price Controls, WASH. EXAM’R (Aug.
16, 2011), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/remembering-nixons-wage-and-price-controls [https:// 
perma.cc/E9DC-9E8Q] (describing Nixon’s freezing of prices and wages throughout the United States 
as an example of a practice articulated by George W. Bush regarding abandoning the “free-market 
principles to save the free-market system”). 
57. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641). 
58. Id.
 59. See generally Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 482 (2015) (“Bailouts are socially desirable because Congress cannot 
anticipate the contingencies that would make possible an ex ante insurance system that regulates
behavior and charges firms in advance for liquidity support or other transfers.”); Adam J. Levitin, In 
Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011) (proposing a framework for analyzing bailouts’ legitimacy); 
Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governmental Intervention in an Economic Crisis, 19 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 7, 8 (2016) (“It may be possible to make bailouts less likely, but we cannot make them disappear 
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mechanisms possibly impractical. Given this reality, one cannot exclude the 
possibility that future bailouts will break the rules for emergency lending 
established under the Dodd-Frank. 
The elasticity paradigm also underscores a misperception common amongst 
macroeconomists and lawyers alike, which confuses the call for institutional
analysis in macroeconomics with a search for the optimal and definitive laws that 
will solve problems once and for all—a kind of ceaseless search for the Holy 
Grail. For example, in his instructive Big Ideas in Macroeconomics, Kartik
Athreya argues that society’s best bet to prevent future financial crises would be
to cause “[shareholders of] financial market entities to believe that policymakers 
possess an ironclad commitment to allowing them to fail and vanish . . . .”60 
However, this belief will always be evanescent. Shareholders will sooner or 
later realize that policymakers’ commitments of that kind are not fully credible, 
precisely because of the informational limitations inherent to the incompleteness 
paradigm: the informational black holes that render the future fundamentally 
uncertain, and the informational asymmetries that cause safeguards such as
bailout clauses to bring moral hazard. In short, the difficulty in arriving at 
ironclad commitments is the difficulty of abiding by the incompleteness
paradigm. Therein lies the core justification for embracing the elasticity
paradigm. 
An unacknowledged example of deference to the elasticity paradigm is 
articulated by Yair Listokin in his recent book, Law and Macroeconomics.61 
Listokin advocates that regulatory and approval standards for construction be 
made more flexible during economic downturns to boost aggregate demand and 
smooth the fluctuation of the business cycle.62 Thus, for example, a project with 
questionable credentials gets regulatory clearance when the economy is in the 
zero-lower bound, but an otherwise identical project gets denied at other times. 
This disparity is not unfair because “the two proposals are not the same”63 as their 
“social cost differs dramatically. . . .”64 
Two ideas that undergird the elasticity paradigm are apparent in this 
formulation. First, this example illustrates that the legal meaning of a government 
action is time dependent: For instance, a bank rescue during a crisis can lawfully
be treated differently from another that takes places in ordinary times. The
meaning of law is in this sense elastic—that is, time-variant. Second, the legal 
system upholds the rule of law by preserving the institutional model that is put in 
altogether.”). See also REPUBLICAN STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON FIN. SERV., 113TH CONG., FAILING TO
END “TOO BIG TO FAIL”: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT FOUR YEARS LATER (2014), 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Other/House_Republications_071814_tbtf_report_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QRK-MMRK] (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act was based on a misunderstanding 
of the government’s bailout policy). 
60. KARTIK B. ATHREYA, BIG IDEAS IN MACROECONOMICS: A NONTECHNICAL VIEW 316 (2013). 
61. LISTOKIN, supra note 16. 
62. Id. at 143.  
63. Id.
 64. Id.
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place through a myriad of laws and mechanisms. The focus lies therefore not in 
enforcing every rule, but on drawing a distinction between interventions that 
update the rule of the game in a new environment from those that in fact 
represent a departure from the existing model.65 
To be sure, the recognition of the elasticity paradigm makes room for broader 
judgment calls on the part of regulators and risks opening the door for 
arbitrariness, the very door that the rule of law aims to close. The paradigm is 
therefore of doubtful use in times of normalcy but might be a necessary addition




Most of what passes as macroeconomic policymaking is lawmaking as well. 
Policy, whether it be fiscal, employment, trade, or foreign exchange, is typically
implemented with legislation, decrees and regulations—that is, with laws. Even
monetary policy as currently practiced in the United States is legalized, because
easing and tightening, although discretionary, are bound by a statutory long-run 
economic objective of maximum employment and stable prices.66 To suggest that 
law and macroeconomics will only now finally be conjoined is false and 
misleading. They are, and have been, inseparable.
What we are experiencing instead is the merging of law and macroeconomics 
as academic disciplines. Thus, scholars with a deep understanding of the theory 
and workings of the legal system are deploying their conceptual arsenal, 
experience, and intellect to discuss standard macroeconomic topics such as 
countercyclality and growth—or instead, are resorting to macroeconomics to
reflect upon standard questions in the law.67 Although the field of law and 
economics historically treats macroeconomics as a background topic, the 
shockwaves of the 2007–08 financial crisis have brought up novel concerns and a
65. See Kathryn Judge, Regulation and Deregulation: The Baseline Challenge, 104 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 101, 104 (2018) (“Determining when a change in the law is merely updating the rules of the game
to maintain the status quo in a new environment, or is instead changing the rules of the game, has
important implications for the type of processes that ought to accompany the action.”). 
66. See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012) (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates 
commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively
the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”). See also Joy 
Zhu, Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977, FED. RESERVE HISTORY (Nov. 22, 2013), https:// 
www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/fed_reform_act_of_1977 [https://perma.cc/8WV7-T5FQ] (“When
the Federal Reserve was first established in 1913, Congress directed it only to ‘furnish an elastic currency, 
to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper’ and ‘to establish a more effective supervision of 
banking in the United States.’”). 
67. It is not entirely novel for legal scholars to explore macroeconomics. For example, the tradition 
of economic law, especially international economic law, addresses problems of international coordination 
in finance and trade, which lies at the heart of macroeconomics. 
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renewed call for legal scholars to engage with macroeconomic policies and
reasoning.
This renewed urgency to jointly consider law and macroeconomics gives rise 
to two main problems, one concerning the choice of the macroeconomic 
framework to be employed, and the other concerning the challenges to the rule 
of law that often accompany macroeconomic intervention. These questions can 
be treated as being part of two different intellectual projects: One is a 
macroeconomic analysis of law, which applies economic theory to legal materials 
and coordination problems in attempt to find hidden meanings or 
counterintuitive results. The second project revolves around discussing how law,
courts, and legal reasoning matter beyond the self-evident observation that 
macroeconomic policies are implemented with laws. Taken together, these 
projects constitute what might one day be the law and macroeconomics tradition. 
There is friction between these projects. Macroeconomic analysis 
understands law in terms of the criteria set out by the exterior viewpoint, that is, 
the macroeconomic lenses to be employed. Law therefore only has meaning 
through the vocabulary of something else. This is problematic. As demonstrated 
here, the distinctions between the incompleteness and elasticity paradigms show
that the meaning of law is being continuously disputed. Law is not simply a thing 
out there to be illuminated with the lights of this or that economic framework, 
but rather an institutional reality that may be redefined without losing its 
character. This is the inescapable tension within the new law and 
macroeconomics tradition, if it should ever come into being.
